Amnesty International has documented how Pakistan has built a wide-reaching surveillance and censorship system using technology supplied by companies across several regions. The investigation, carried out with media and research partners including Paper Trail Media, DER STANDARD, Follow the Money, The Globe and Mail, Justice for Myanmar, InterSecLab, and the Tor Project, found that tools from North America, Europe, China, and the Middle East form the backbone of Pakistan’s monitoring network.
At the core are two platforms, the Web Monitoring System (WMS 2.0) and the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS). Both were developed and upgraded through international suppliers. The first firewall arrived in 2018 with equipment from Canadian firm Sandvine, later renamed AppLogic Networks. Trade records show shipments to local contractors as early as 2017, including Inbox Technologies, SN Skies Pvt Ltd, and A Hamson Inc.
By 2023, WMS 2.0 replaced the original setup. This version was supplied by China’s Geedge Networks with additional components from Niagara Networks in the United States and Thales in France. Amnesty describes it as a commercial export of China’s Great Firewall.
LIMS was built with technology from German company Utimaco, distributed through UAE-based Datafusion. Together, these systems gave Pakistani authorities broad capacity to intercept and review traffic moving across national telecommunications networks.
Surveillance Reach
WMS 2.0 works as both a monitoring and blocking tool. Investigators found it could log emails, VoIP calls, and browsing sessions in real time. It also allows operators to block websites and virtual private networks. With deep packet inspection, data sent over the internet can be broken down and examined in detail. While HTTPS encryption masks content, operators can still identify websites visited and gather metadata.
The firewall runs across all major telecom providers and at Pakistan’s international internet landing station. This positioning ensures that most digital traffic entering or leaving the country is subject to monitoring.
LIMS extends surveillance to phone calls, text messages, and location data. Investigators found that state agencies can initiate monitoring with only a phone number. This provides access to communication logs and, when connections are unencrypted, entire pages of content. Even when encrypted, the system still records websites visited and times of access.
According to Amnesty, LIMS has the capacity to monitor more than four million users at once. Telecom operators are legally required to connect their systems as a condition of their license.
Public Financing
Expansion of the network has relied heavily on public funds. In November 2023, five billion rupees from the Universal Service Fund were redirected to the firewall project through the ICT R&D Fund, also known as Ignite. In February 2024, the Economic Coordination Committee approved another ten billion rupees under the Digital Information Infrastructure initiative, which includes WMS 2.0.
These allocations covered upgrades to the firewall and wider integration of LIMS. Amnesty’s report traces the procurement of equipment through trade databases, showing how suppliers across multiple jurisdictions provided hardware and software despite the human rights risks.
Oversight and Legal Gaps
Pakistan’s Fair Trial Act requires warrants for surveillance, but Amnesty found these safeguards are often bypassed. The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority has acknowledged in court that large-scale interception takes place.
Authorities frame the systems as lawful interception tools for national security. Critics argue that little transparency or independent oversight exists. Citizens are not notified when their data is monitored, and Amnesty concludes that in practice LIMS enables indiscriminate surveillance.
Effect on Citizens
Journalists and civil society groups report that the systems are already narrowing space for free expression. One journalist told investigators that after publishing on corruption, both he and his contacts faced greater scrutiny. The awareness of monitoring led him to self-censor and avoid open communication, even with family members.
Amnesty’s Secretary General Agnès Callamard compared the technologies to watchtowers that constantly observe citizens, warning that unchecked surveillance undermines civic space and democratic participation.
International Role
The investigation highlights the responsibility of companies and governments exporting surveillance tools. Of twenty companies contacted, only Niagara Networks in the United States and AppLogic Networks in Canada provided full responses. Utimaco and Datafusion initially answered in 2024 but did not follow up.
Out of nine government bodies approached, only Germany’s export authority and Canada’s trade bureau acknowledged correspondence. Neither gave substantive replies. Pakistan’s government did not respond.
Amnesty argues that this silence reflects a broader failure to regulate the trade of surveillance equipment. The report notes that suppliers in Europe, North America, China, and the UAE continue to export such tools without safeguards, even where they are used to restrict rights.
Expanding Framework
Together, the firewall and intercept platforms form a nationwide monitoring system. They rely on international technology, domestic funding, and limited oversight. Amnesty concludes that this framework leaves private communication exposed and narrows space for free expression.
Pakistan’s case is presented as part of a larger global debate on how surveillance technologies are exported and used. With procurement continuing and safeguards absent, the country’s monitoring capacity is expected to expand further, raising deeper concerns over privacy and basic freedoms.
Notes: This post was edited/created using GenAI tools.
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by Asim BN via Digital Information World
